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Abstract 
The effects of a wage subsidy program on the duration of insured unemployment are 
investigated using experimental data. Participation in the experiment was voluntary and 
about one third of the subjects refused to take the subsidy voucher offered to them. 
Because subsidies appear to have stigmatic effects which tend to lower participation 
rates by high-skilled workers, experimental participants have longer average durations of 
unemployment than non-participants. However, correcting for self-selection, we find that 
wage subsidies can substantially increase a participant's probability of reemployment. 
Subsidies are also compared to a search bonus proposal which is also cost effective, but, 
due to differences in participation patterns, has rather different effects. 
Experimental Estimates of the Impact of Wage 
Subsidies"' 
Jeffrey A. Dubin Douglas Rivers* 
1 Introduction
Wage subsidies have been proposed as a flexible, efficient and relatively low cost method 
for reducing unemployment. In a wage subsidy program, job creation and hiring decisions 
remain the responsibility of private firms, though the cost is partially borne by govern­
ment. Market incentives should promote the efficient allocation of resources. If workers 
accumulate human capital in the course of employment, subsidies can be gradually re­
duced without adverse consequences. In contrast to alternative employment policies, 
such as job training and public sector employment, which are notoriously expensive and 
inflexible, subsidy costs are relatively low and can be adjusted to changing labor market 
conditions. 
Though in principle an attractive alternative to conventional unemployment policies, 
wage subsidies have been tried only rarely in the United States. Theoretical arguments 
for wage subsidies were made long ago by Pigou (1933) and Kaldor (1936)1 , but recent 
empirical studies ha':"e raised questions about whether wage subsidies are a practical pol­
icy for reducing unemployment. Woodbury and Spiegelman (1987) found that offering a 
wage subsidy for Unemployment Insurance (UI) claimants produced, at best, a modest
decrease in the duration of insured unemployment. Burtless (1985), analyzing a more dis­
advantaged population, reports that subsidy recipients experienced longer unemployment 
spells than non-recipients. 
The experimental results are puzzling. Relatively few employers collected the subsi­
dies to which they were entitled, suggesting that many workers did not inform them of 
'We would like to thank the Associate Editor and referees for helpful comments. Research support 
was provided by the Productive Employment Foundation. We are grateful to Allen V.C. Davis for his 
support and encouragement. 
1See Kesselman (1969), Burdett (1979), and Layard and Nickell (1980) for more recent analyses.
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their eligibility for a wage subsidy. Burtless speculates that being identified as a subsidy 
recipient has a stigmatic effect on job seekers that outweighs the value of the subsidy. 
But, if this were the case, why wouldn't workers simply conceal their eligibility? Wood­
bury and Spiegelman report more positive results (offering a subsidy reduces the total 
amount of UI benefits paid by more than the cost of the subsidy), but the differences 
are only statistically significant for white women. They offer no explanation for why the 
program should be effective for this group and not others. 
In this article we reexamine the efficacy of wage subsidies for UI recipients using data 
from a demonstration project conducted by the Illinois Department of Employment Secu­
rity (DES). The availability of data from a randomized experiment would appear to make 
this a simple task. Comparisons of experimental treatment groups with controls permit 
"model-free" inference. We shall argue, however,· that experimental contrasts often are 
not very powerful for detecting treatment effects and sometimes do not correspond to the 
differences of primary theoretical interest. Vouchers are shown to be relatively effective 
for those who use them, though the analysis is complicated by the fact that voucher 
usage is self-selected. 
We also discuss an alternative proposal-a search bonus-which was included in the 
Illinois UI experiment and which has received favorable notice (Woodbury and Spiegel­
man, 1987) . A carefnl comparison of the two proposals indicates that the effects of each 
are quite different, though each appears cost effective. Direct comparisons of experimen­
tal effects which ignore differential participation rates give a distorted picture of how the 
programs work. Both the wage subsidy and bonus programs have a positive impact, but 
upon different segments of the labor force. 
The paper is divided into six sections. Section 2 briefly describes the Illinois UI 
experiment. Participation rates in the wage subsidy experiment were relatively low and 
were related to various worker characteristics. In the following section, we consider the 
general problem of selection bias in policy experiments. Section 4 analyzes the utilization 
of wage subsidies based upon a simple signalling model. In section 5 the impact of the 
subsidy and bonus programs on the duration of unemployment and reemployment wages 
is investigated. The final section presents our conclusions. 
2 The Illinois· UI,Experiment
Our analysis of wage subsidies is based upon data from a demonstration project con­
ducted by the Illinois Department of Employment Security in 1984 and 1985. A total of 
17,306 UI claimants in twenty-two DES offices between July and November 1984 were 
randomly assigned to three experimental groups: a control group (who were granted their 
normal UI benefits), a wage subsidy group (who were offered a wage subsidy voucher in 
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addition to their normal benefits), and a search bonus group (who were offered a bonus 
in addition to their normal benefits). After completing a baseline survey, 5,205 claimants 
were eliminated because they did not meet criteria for participation in the experiment 
(described below), leaving a total of 12,101 experimental subjects. In addition, we have 
eliminated 459 observations because of invalid or missing values, leaving 11,642 complete 
cases in the analyses reported below. 2 
The wage subsidy portion of the experiment consisted of a voucher which a worker 
could present to potential employers as an inducement for his or her hire. If the employer 
hired the claimant within eleven weeks of the initial UI claim date and retained the 
claimant for at least four months (for thirty hours or more per week), the employer 
could submit the voucher for a payment of $500 from DES. The search bonus portion of 
the experiment had a similar structure, except that payment was made to the claimant 
and no employer participation was involved. That is, claimants were not required (and 
presumably did not) inform employers of their participation in the experiment. They, 
instead of the employer, submitted the voucher to DES and, in turn, received $500 if 
they were employed for at least four months working thirty or more hours per week. 
Participation in the experiment was limited to persons between twenty and fifty­
four years of age filing initial UI claims who were entitled to a full twenty-six weeks of 
benefits. Excluded were workers on layoff with a definite recall date, union members who 
find jobs through a hiring hall, recent veterans, and federal employees. Consequently, 
the experimental sample is somewhat more homogeneous than the entire UI population, 
though, because of the exclusion of laid off workers with recall dates, sample members 
experienced somewhat longer unemployment spells than average. 
Subjects were informed of their assignment to treatment groups before they agreed 
to participate in the experiment. Not everyone who was offered a wage subsidy or bonus 
agreed to accept the voucher which was offered. As can be seen from Table 1, partici­
pation rates were significantly lower in the wage subsidy experiment than in the bonus 
experiment (68.0% versus 88.8%). 
I Table 1 about here j 
There are a number a possible explanations for refusal to participate, ranging from 
an inability to understand the programs to a possible "stigma" associated with being 
a subsidy recipient. The ·wage ·subsidy,· in contrast·to the bonus, requires participation 
both by the claimant and potential employers. For UI claimants to derive any benefit 
2In addition to 382 observations for which the claimant's agreement to participate in the experiment 
\Vas not recorded, the follo\ving data inconsistencies were discovered: 5 claimants did not meet the 
minimum earnings requirement for UI eligibility, 44 rehire dates preceded initial UI claim dates, 1 uotice 
of hire was submitted without agreement to participate, and 32 vouchers were paid 'ivithout a notice of 
hire being submitted. These deletions result in slight differences bet,veen the numbers reported here and 
those found in Woodbury and Spiegelman (1987). 
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from the wage subsidy, they must persuade an employer that the subsidy can be used 
to offset their employment cost. For high wage workers, a small subsidy, such as that 
offered in the experiment, might not be worth the bother. 
Burtless (1985) has also argued that subsidies can have a negative impact on recip­
ients' employment prospects by identifying them as members of a low-skill population 
which has been targeted for government assistance. Consequently, some members of the 
subsidized population may find it in their interest not to inform potential employers of 
their eligibility for a wage subsidy. This could account for the high refusal rates in the 
wage subsidy portion of the Illinois experiments. A full-scale implementation of the pro­
gram could reduce recipient confusion and uncertainty, but stigma effects, if they exist, 
might well remain. 
Both the wage subsidy and search bonus reduced the average duration of unem­
ployment: 40.4% of the claimants in the search bonus experiment and 37.9% of the 
claimants in the wage subsidy experiment were reemployed within eleven weeks of filing 
for unemployment insurance, compared to only 35.0% of the controls. The pattern of 
unemployment spells is displayed in Figure 1 which shows the the reemployment rates 
in each treatment group for the thirty weeks following initial UI claims. Control group 
members are the slowest to be rehired. By making the vouchers expire after eleven weeks, 
an incentive was provided to encourage more intensive job search. 
I Figure 1 about here I 
The other anticipated effect of the vouchers was to increase the likelihood that 
claimants would receive an acceptable wage offer in the early period of an unemployment 
spell and, consequently, experience a briefer duration of unemployment than members of 
the control group. The wage subsidy, for instance, should increase the amount employers 
are willing to offer the worker (since the $500 voucher payment could be used to offset in­
creased labor costs) and, thus, it was anticipated, increase the chances the worker would 
receive an acceptable wage offer. The bonus, on the other hand, encourages the worker 
to accept a lower wage than he or she otherwise might, in exchange for the $500 voucher 
payment. In both cases, however, the effect would be the same: unemployment spells 
would be shortened and UI benefit costs would be reduced. 
A baseline for comparing post-treatment wages is obtained by examining wage dif­
ferences prior.,,to . the experiment .. The left side. of Table 2 .exhibits the average weekly 
earnings of claimants in the five full quarters prior to their filing for unemployment 
compensation (the "base period") . Random assignment of treatments insures that base 
period earnings are approximately the same in each group (varying between $254 and 
$256 per week). However, agreement to participate in the wage subsidy experiment is 
clearly related to base period earnings. Nonparticipants earn, on average, $45 more per 
week than participants. Note that participation is unrelated to base period earnings in 
the search bonus experiment. 
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I Table 2 about here I 
Earnings in the first full quarter after the initial claim (the "post-claim quarter") 
are shown on the right side of Table 2. The average earnings in the post-claim quarter 
are only about 40% of the average earnings in the base period since fewer than half the 
workers were rehired before the end of the post-claim quarter. There is no significant 
difference between the average earnings in the control and treatment groups. However, 
the mean earnings comparison conceals substantial variation within the wage subsidy 
group. Those who agreed to participate in the wage subsidy experiment had earnings of 
only $89 per week in the post-claim quarter, compared to $94 for controls and $113 for 
non-participants assigned to the wage subsidy group. In the search bonus experiment, 
the pattern was reversed with participants earning $106 and nonparticipants only $94. 
The two basic factors determining wages in the post-claim quarter are the amount of 
time employed and, if employed, the wage rate. Since both the wage subsidy and bonus 
treatments reduce the duration of unemployment, the above earnings differences may 
reflect amount of time worked rather than differences in reemployment wage rates. Our 
dataset, however, only contains quarterly earnings, rather than actual wage rates. For 
workers who were rehired in the post-claim quarter, we have constructed a weekly wage 
rate by dividing quarterly earnings in the post-claim quarter by the number of weeks 
worked.3 The average wage calculated this way is subject to possible selection bias since 
we are conditioning upon the worker having been rehired. This problem is treated in 
section 7 below. 
Table 3 compares the average weekly wages in the base period to those in the post­
claim quarter for all workers who were rehired in the post-claim quarter. For control 
group members, the average weekly wage in the post-claim quarter fell to $253 from $264 
in the base period. Contrary to expectations, availability of the bonus does not cause 
unemployed workers to accept lower wages: the decline in average weekly wages from 
the base period ($264) to the post-claim period ($254) is indistinguishable from that 
found in the control group, and there were no significant differences between participants 
and non-participants. It appears that the bonus does not cause workers to adjust their 
reservation wages but to engage in more intensive search to collect the bonus.4 
I Table 3 about here I 
3The follo,ving procedure was used. to_ compute the. number of weeks employed in the post-claim 
quarter. If the rehire date was after the end of the post-claim quarter, the number of weeks employed 
was zero. If the rehire date was before the beginning of the post-claim quarter, the number of weeks 
employed 'vas thirteen. In all other cases, the nu1nber of weeks employed was equal to the number of 
days between the rehire date and the end of the post-claim quarter divided by seven and rounded up. 
This calculation overstates the number of weeks 'vorked since some workers undoubtedly lost their ne\v 
jobs before the end of the post-claim quarter. Data on refiling for UI were found to be highly unreliable 
and are not analyzed here. 
4See Solow (1990) for further discussion. 
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Participation in the wage subsidy experiment appears to have a perverse effect. Al­
though the average weekly wage in the post-claim quarter in the entire wage subsidy 
group ($250) does not differ significantly from those in the other groups, wage subsidy 
participants fare worse than non-participants or control group members. Those who ac­
cepted the wage subsidy voucher had wages of only $225 per week compared to $253 
for controls and $301 for those who refused the wage subsidy voucher. These results 
are similar to those found by Burtless (1985). It appears that participation in the wage 
subsidy experiment decreases both gross earnings and wage rates. Nonparticipants who 
are reemployed, however, actually have higher wage rates in the post-claim period than 
in the base period. 
Before concluding that subsidies are harmful, consider how it could be possible for 
nonparticipants to earn more, on average, than control group members. From an em­
ployer's point of view, the two types of job seekers are indistinguishable-neither has 
a voucher. For one to believe that subsidies are harmful, one would have to simulta­
neously believe that refusing a subsidy somehow increases workers' wages relative to 
that of workers who were never offered a subsidy (the control group). This is entirely 
implausible. 
The only possible explanation for the post-claim wage differences within the wage 
subsidy group is self-selection of experimental participants. In the base period, as noted 
previously, those who refused the wage subsidy voucher had higher weekly wages than 
those who accepted the voucher. This means that comparisons of participants and non­
participants that fail to control for differences between the groups will not accurately 
reflect the impact of wage subsidies. On the other hand, grouping together those who 
accepted and refused the wage subsidy voucher results in a comparison that mixes the 
wage subsidy effect with the participation effect. The next section discusses how these 
effects might be disentangled. 
3 Bias in Social Experiments
Wage subsidies have both supply and demand effects which are difficult to sort out 
without making strong assumptions about how workers and employers would respond 
to the availability of a subsidy. The primary advantage of an experimental trial is that 
behavioral responses to a subsidy are directly observable. Woodbury and Spiegelman 
(1987, p. 518) argue that random allocation of treatments obviates the need for any 
econometric modeling: 
It follows that comparisons between the Claimant Experiment group and the con­
trol group (or between the Employer Experiment group and the control group)
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implicitly control for all observed and unobserved variables that may have con­
tributed to the outcomes that are of interest-duration of insured unemployment 
and post-reemployment earnings. Thus, a simple comparison of the mean weeks of 
insured unemployment for members of either experimental group with mean weeks 
of unemployment for members of the control group will show the impact of the 
treatment in question on the duration of insured unemployment. 
While randomization is very useful, it does not cure all of the problems in estimating the 
impact of a wage subsidy. 
Randomized experiments are now used with some regularity to evaluate alternative 
policy proposals. In observational studies, self-selection of "treatments" is always a 
potential source of bias. Random allocation of treatments guarantees that members 
of the treatment group differ in no systematic way from the control group (if sample 
size is sufficiently large) . There is more, however, to experimental design than random
allocation of treatments. The design of the UI experiment is different from that of the 
typical biomedical experiment and these differences have implications for how data from 
the experiment should be analyzed. 
The differences between social and biomedical experiments a.re evident if one compares 
the UI experiment to the 1954 field trial of the Salk poliomyelitis vaccine.5 The polio 
experiment involved 750,000 children from grades one to three. Nearly half the pa.rents 
did not give permission to have their children inoculated. Participating children were 
randomly assigned to treatment and control groups. The experiment was run double­
blind with controls receiving a placebo so that neither they nor the experimenters would 
know whether they had received the vaccine or not. Important differences between the 
designs of the polio and UI experiments are (1) the order of agreement to participate and 
assignment of treatments, (2) use of a placebo, and (3) observability of treatment. 
Both the polio and UI experiments had high refusal rates. In fact, the proportion of 
parents who refused to have their children inoculated with the polio vaccine was higher 
than the proportion of UI claimants who refused the wage subsidy voucher. Nonpartic­
ipants also differed systematically from participants in the polio trials. Children vary 
enormously in their susceptibility to polio. Infants who are exposed to the polio virus 
develop a natural immunity that protects them when they are older. Exposure to the 
virus as an infant is related to family hygiene so the risk of contracting polio as a child 
is negatively correlated with family background variables such as parent's education and 
income. Since parents with lower education and income were less likely to permit their 
children to be inoculated, nonparticipants were less vulnerable to polio. 
In the polio experiment, as in most scientific experiments, agreement to participate 
1s secured before treatments are allocated. Eliminating children whose pa.rents would 
5We are relying upon Francis et al. (1955). See also Brownlee (1954) and Meier ( 1972). 
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not allow them to be inoculated gives a biased subsample of the original experimental 
population. This bias was substantial: the incidence of polio was 71 confirmed cases per 
100,000 children who agreed to participate and received the placebo compared to 46 cases 
per 100,000 nonparticipants. However, random assignment of treatments after agreement 
to participate ensures that the treatment and control groups are random subsamples of 
the participating populations. 
The polio experiment also suffers from attrition after treatments have been assigned. 
Some children receive only one or two injections of the vaccine or placebo. The level of 
post-assignment attrition was modest (about 43 of those who initially agreed to partic­
ipate). More significantly, since subjects did not know whether they were to be injected 
with the vaccine or a harmless saline solution, treatment and control group members are 
equally likely to drop out of the experiment. Thus, the use of a placebo ensures that 
post-assignment attrition is independent of which treatment was assigned. Deleting those 
who did not receive a full set of injections from both the control and treatment groups 
further restricts the sample without making the initial randomization ineffective. 
In contrast, all refusals in the UI experiment occurred after treatments were assigned. 
Furthermore, nonparticipation in the UI experiment is strongly correlated with treatment 
since there are no refusals to participate in the control group. (In fact, controls were never 
informed that they were participating in an experiment.) Eliminating refusals from the 
sample would make the treatment group self-selected and bias comparisons with the 
control group (which remains a random sample of the experimental population). 
To complicate matters further, participation in the UI experiment is only partially 
observable. Some subjects may have taken the wage subsidy voucher without making 
any subsequent use of it. It is as if the experimenter did not administer the polio vaccine 
directly to the subjects, but distributed the vaccine and asked the subjects to administer 
it to themselves at home instead. If some of the subjects in the treatment group disobeyed 
instructions and did not take the vaccine, they would actually belong to the control group 
though the experimenter would misclassify them as treatment group members. 
The two different experimental designs are summarized in Table 4. In the polio 
experiment, initial refusals are not assigned to either the treatment or control group. 
The relatively few post-assignment dropouts can be grouped with the pre-assignment 
refusals and the analysis limited to those actually participating in the experiment. In the 
UI experiment, we cannot distinguish between control group members who would have 
utilized a wage subsidy voucher and those who would not have. The treatment group 
can be divided into those who accepted the voucher and those who refused it, though, as 
noted above, some of those in the treatment group who accepted the voucher may not 
have used it to obtain employment. 
I Table 4 about here I 
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There a.re two possible methods for analyzing experiments with nonpa.rticipa.tion. 
The method normally used is to eliminate nonparticipants (both pre a.nd post-assignment 
refusals) a.nd to com pa.re the mean response of control a.nd treatment group members who 
a.greed to participate. We ca.11 this the "complete cases" comparison. The alternative 
is to compare a l l  control group members with a l l  treatment group members, regardless 
of whether they a.greed to participate in the experiment. We call this the "full sample" 
compa.nson. 
Let Y denote the response variable of interest (e.g., rate of polio or duration of insured 
unemployment) . Let A be a. dummy variable indicating whether the subject a.greed to 
participate in the experiment (A= 1 if a.greed, A= 0 if refused) a.nd T be a.n indicator 
of treatment assignment (T = 1 if treatment, T = 0 if control). In the polio experiment, 
agreement should be interpreted a.s willingness to be inoculated. Similarly, agreement 
to participate in the UI experiment should be interpreted a.s willingness to accept the 
wage subsidy voucher if it were offered. If treatments a.re assigned only after agreement 
to participate, a.s in the polio experiment, T is not observed if A = 0. If subjects a.re 
informed of their treatment assignments before they agree to participate, a.s in the UI 
experiment, then A is not observed if T = 0. 
In both designs, A a.nd T a.re independent. In the polio experiment no treatment 
assignment is ma.de if the subject initially refuses to participate, so there is no loss of 
generality in assuming P(T = ljA = 0) = P(T = ljA = 1). (Because of the placebo, 
post-treatment refusals a.re also independent of treatment assignment.) In the UI exper­
iment, treatments a.re assigned randomly to the entire experimental population. This 
means that if those assigned to the control group were offered a. wage subsidy voucher, 
the expected proportion of refusals would be the same a.s that in the a.ctua.l treatment 
group. Therefore, let 1f = P(A = 1) = P(A = ljT). 
There is some ambiguity a.bout the definition of treatment effect . What is usually 
meant by "treatment effect" is, in fa.ct, a.n average of treatment effects a.cross some 
population. The complete cases method estimates the average treatment effect for those 
who a.greed to participate, 
5 = E(YIT = 1,A = 1)- E(YIT = O, A = 1). 
The full sample method estimates a. different average, 
6 = E(YIT = 1) - E(YIT = 0). 
Which is the relevant comparison? 'fi is a. weighted average of the treatment effect for 
those who agree to participate a.nd those who refuse, 
'fi = m5 + (1 - 1f )5',
where 
5' = E(YIT = 1, A = 0) - E(YIT = O, A = 0) 
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is the average treatment effect for the refusals. However, treatment is irrelevant for 
refusals. Someone who refuses to be inoculated with the vaccine faces the same risk of 
polio as if he had been given a placebo. Likewise, someone who refuses a wage subsidy 
voucher is in the same position as if he had never been offered a voucher. Thus, 8' = 0 
and, as a consequence, 8 = 1i / 7r. 
It is common practice in social experiments to call 8 the "average treatment effect," 
though it is, more precisely, the average effect of being offered the treatment. Since 
the effect of being offered and refusing the treatment is known a priori, the interesting 
quantity is the effect of the treatment upon those who agree to participate, namely 6. 
Though the full sample comparison gives a biased estimate of 6, it is still feasible to 
test hypotheses about 6 using the full sample comparison. For example, the hypothesis 
Ho : 6 = 0 is equivalent to H� : 1i = 0 if 7r > 0. The latter hypothesis can be test�d using
the full sample comparison, though the test may not be very powerful. Since 6 can be 
small because either 6 is small or 7r is small, a fair evaluation requires that we distinguish
these two cases. 
It is constructive to consider what conclusions would have been drawn from the polio 
experiment if it had been conducted in the same way as the UI experiment. If the 
treatments had been assigned in the polio experiment before agreement to participate 
had been secured, half of the initial refusals would have been assigned to the control and 
treatment groups. Apportioning the cases of polio among the refusals to the treatment 
groups in equal proportions yields a polio rate of 59 per 100,000 for the controls versus 
36 per 100,000 in the treatment group. Although this difference using the full sample 
comparison is still statistically significant (z = -4.48, p < 0.01), the estimated treatment
effect is only half as large as that estimated using the complete cases comparison (71 cases 
per 100,000 among the controls versus 28 per 100,000 in the treatment group; z = -6.01, 
p < 0.01). The evidence from this comparison is weak enough that population wide
vaccinations might have been delayed or avoided altogether. 
There are a number of lessons in the polio experiment for analysis of the UI experi­
ment. First, a small average effect in a heterogeneous population may mask substantial 
effects among subgroups in the population. Second, most social experiments have vol­
untary participation after subjects have been assigned to treatment groups. We know, 
however, on a priori grounds that there is no treatment effect for nonparticipants. If par­
ticipation rates are low, it may be hard to detect a substantial treatment effect among 
the portion of the population who would voluntarily participate using the full sample 
comparison. Third, response differences between nonparticipants in the treatment group 
and the control group must, of necessity, represent the effects of self-selection. 
The complete cases comparison is not possible in the UI experiment because the 
controls do not receive a placebo and have no opportunity to refuse to participate. The 
design of the unemployment experiment does, however, allow us to compare participants 
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and nonparticipants in the treatment group: 
811 = E(YIT = l,A = 1)- E(YIT = l,A = 0).
Since the decision to participate is made by the subjects, this comparison is subject to 
selection bias. We can, however, correct for selection bias using 
8 = 811 + .!:_[E(YIT= 1, A= 0) - E(YIT = O)].
Jr 
(1) 
The second term of (1) is a form of selectivity correction as it compares the response of 
those refusing the treatment to those who were never offered it. If the latter difference 
is zero, the refusals can be treated as a random sample of the experimental population. 
Table 5 reproduces the full sample comparisons of Table 1 along with estimates of the 
treatment effects for those who accepted the voucher offered to them. The full sample 
estimate of the treatment effect is Y, - Ya, where Y1 is the mean of the response variable
Y among all those assigned to the treatment group and Ya is the mean of Y among all
controls. The "adjusted comparison" in the second column of Table 5 is (?, - Ya)/ir,
where ir is the proportion of treatment group members who agree to participate.6 The 
estimated wage subsidy effects for those accepting the voucher are, of course, much larger 
than the full sample effects. The wage subsidy effects are still somewhat smaller than the 
search bonus effects, but the adjusted effects are of similar magnitude. (The adjustments 
are conservative since actual voucher usage is overstated by agreement to participate.)
The apparent advantage of the search bonus in the full sample comparisons is mostly 
attributable to its higher participation rate. 
��������-[ Table 5 about here [ 
There are still some problems with the comparisons in Table 5. First, reemployment 
wages are not observed for those who are not rehired. 7 Second, although these com­
parisons are not confounded with other variables, introducing additional controls will 
generally improve the power of hypothesis tests. The method of adjusting for participa­
tion rates in equation (1) is easily modified to accommodate covariates, since 
E(YIX,T = l, A = 1)- E(YIX, T = O, A = 1) = E(YIX, T = l,A = 1)
-E(YIX, T = 1, A= 0) + 7r(�) [E(YIX, T = 1, A= 0) - E(YIX, T = O)], (2)
assuming 7r(X) = P(A = llX) = P(A = llX,T) and E(YIX,T = l,A = 0) =
E(YIX, T = 0, A = 0) as before. In the next section, we estimate a logit model for the 
6 An equivalent estimate of 8 (from Equation 1) is Y11 - Y10 + (Y10 - Yo)/ii", where Y11 and Y10 denote
the mean responses for those assigned to the treatment group who agreed and refused to accept the 
voucher, respectively. 
7This is also a problem in Woodbury and Spiegelman (1987), who by analyzing mean earnings of 
subjects only \vith positive earnings, vitiate the randomization that they rely upon else\vhere. 
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participation probability 7r(X). The following section estimates models for E(YIX, T, A) 
where Y is either duration of unemployment or reemployment wage. All of these models 
have the character of "reduced form" equations. Agreement to participate is clearly en­
dogenous and would require a more elaborate treatment in a structural model. Here it 
suffices to fit the data reasonably well.8 
4 Utilization of Wage Subsidies
A simple signalling model, along the lines of Spence (1973), clarifies the informational 
content of wage subsidies in a competitive labor market. We envision a situation in which 
there are many potential employers for a worker, but employers cannot not directly 
observe the worker's productivity at the time of a hiring decision. We assume that 
employers share a common assessment ms of the average marginal revenue product for 
workers eligible for subsidies and mu for workers ineligible for subsidies. Let p denote the 
fraction of workers eligible for subsidies and s the amount of the subsidy. If the worker 
identifies himself as being a member of the subsidy population, the employer would be 
willing to offer a wage of 
W8 = ffi8 + s, 
assuming employers are risk neutral. Suppose, however, that only a fraction 1r of sub­
sidized workers identify themselves as being eligible for the wage subsidy. Then, the 
average marginal revenue product of job applicants without wage subsidies is 
wu(1r) = (1 - p)mu + p(l - 7r)ms. 
1 - p1r 
In a competitive labor market, this is the amount that an employer would be willing to 
offer an unsubsidized worker if 7r were known. 
Since the subsidized worker decides whether or not to inform the employer of his or 
her eligibility for the wage subsidy before the employer makes a wage offer, we treat 
the worker as a Stackelberg leader. If s 2 mu - m,, all subsidized workers will inform 
employers of their eligibility for the wage subsidy since Ws > wu( 1r) for all 0 ::; 7r < 1. If 
s::; (1- p)(mu -ms), none of the subsidized workers inform employers of their eligibility 
since Ws < wu(1r) for all 0 < 1r::; 1 .  In the intermediate case where (1-p)(mu-ms) < s < 
mu - m,, the subsidized workers play a mixed strategy giving the equilibrium utilization 
rate 
]['* = S - ( 1  - p)(mu - ms) 
ps 
8We could also estimate models for E(YIX, T) and estimate the response effect for participants using 
[E(YIX, T = 1) - E(YIX, T = O)]/,,.(X). The method used in the text gives similar results and has the 
the advantage of emphasizing the nature of non participation in the UI experiment. 
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For subsidies in this range, the utilization rate 7r* is increasing in p and decreasing in 
(mu - ms)/s. From this analysis, a few simple conclusions can be drawn. F irst, if the
difference in productivity levels between the unsubsidized and subsidized populations is 
large relative to the amount of the subsidy, the utilization rate will be lower. Second, if 
the proportion of the labor force eligible to receive wage subsidies is large, the utilization 
rate will be higher. 
It might be argued that UI recipients do not have lower productivity levels than non­
UI recipients, so there should be no stigma attached to being identified as eligible for a 
UI-based subsidy. This argument is incorrect, because it confuses average and marginal 
differences between subsidy recipients and non-recipients. In the above analysis, mu
and ms should be interpreted as the expected marginal revenue product of subsidized 
and unsubsidized workers conditional upon a l l  observable characteristics. The relevant 
comparison is not between a l l  subsidy recipients and non-recipients, but between two 
workers who would appear similar to employers, except that one qualifies for a UI-based 
employment subsidy and the other does not. Similarly, p is the proportion of all workers 
with a given set of observable characteristics who qualify for a subsidy. 
The wage subsidies in the Illinois experiment, unlike those in the Phoenix experiment 
analyzed by Burtless (1985), were not targeted toward a particularly disadvantaged pop­
ulation. The only information recipients reveal by identifying themselves as eligible for 
the subsidy is that they qualified for unemployment insurance. Since the design of the 
experiment was not publicized, it is possible that employers drew unwarranted inferences 
about why recipients qualified for the subsidy. For relatively low-skilled workers, there 
is unlikely to be much additional information contained in the fact that the worker is 
eligible for the wage subsidy, so the ratio (mu - ms)/s would be small, leading to high
utilization rates. For high-skill workers, the potential stigma effects from carrying the 
subsidy are more serious. When reducing output, employers tend to layoff workers with 
low productivity relative to their wages, resulting in a population of UI recipients who 
have lower productivity than their observable characteristics would suggest. In this case, 
the value of (mu - ms)/s is large and the implied utilization rate is low. We show that
this expectation is borne out by the data. 
Actual utilization rates are unknown since some workers who agree to participate in 
the program may never inform potential employers of their eligibility for a wage subsidy. 
However, non-partisipants are not supplied with vouchers so agreement to participate is 
a necessary but not a sufficient condition for utilization of the voucher. VVe use agree­
ment to participate as a proxy for utilization with the recognition that it is upwardly 
biased. Many of the subjects who accepted the subsidy voucher (and whom we classify as 
participating) did not make use of the voucher in seeking employment. Spiegelman and 
Woodbury (1987, ch. 7) report the results of a follow-up survey in which 34% of those 
who a.greed to participate either ha.d forgotten about the voucher or admitted not using 
it. Of the follow-up sample, only 293 claimed to have used the voucher. But even this 
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measure of participation is certainly too high, since there would be a. natural tendency 
for respondents to report voucher usage to those conducting the experiment. 
We do not have access to the follow-up data., but, in any event, there is no reason to 
prefer the survey reports of usage to the agreement to participate measure. In fact, our 
use of the participation proxy need not be a. source of bias. We might view propensity 
to participate as a. continuous variable divided into three ordered categories: refused the 
voucher (corresponding to the lowest propensity to participate), accepted the voucher 
without using it (corresponding to intermediate values), and active usage (corresponding 
to the highest values). With this structure, the logit estimates reported below will still 
be consistent (except for the intercept, which is not identified). 
The preceding theoretical analysis indicates that the probability of utilization is a. 
function of the ratio of the subsidy to the difference in productivity between recipients 
and nonrecipients perceived by employers. Since the subsidy a.mount does not vary in this 
experiment, it suffices to relate participation rates to characteristics of recipients which 
might be associated with their productivity levels.9 Table 6 presents logit estimates for 
the probability of agreeing to participate in ea.ch of the experiments as a. function of the 
claimant's characteristics (sex, race, age, base period earnings, and UI benefit leve!1°). 
I Table 6 about here I 
Participation rates a.re generally about 21 percent higher in the bonus experiment 
than in the subsidy experiment, as indicated by the larger value of the constant term 
in that equation. Hispanics were less likely to participate in either the subsidy or the 
bonus experiment. A study of earnings, benefits ,  and the remaining demographic indica­
tors revealed that Hispanics were about 7 percent less likely to participate in the bonus 
experiment and 22 percent less likely to participate in the subsidy experiment (perhaps 
because of language problems). Differences in participation rates between other demo­
graphic groups a.re small. Blacks were a. bit less likely than whites to participate in the 
bonus experiment, but equally likely to participate in the subsidy experiment. Males 
were significantly more likely to participate in either experiment (by about 6 percent in 
the subsidy experiment and 3 percent in the bonus experiment). 
There is no significant impact of either base wage level (average weekly earnings in 
the two full quarters prior to initial filing of a UI claim) or weekly UI benefit level on 
the search bonus exp·�iment. In the·wa.ge subsidy experiment, on the other hand, every 
additional $100 of weekly income in the base period reduces participation by a.bout 2 
percent. This fact provides some support for the stigma. explanation advanced above. 
High wage workers appear to be reluctant to utilize the subsidy. Base period earnings, 
9It would be desirable for several different levels of subsidy to be used in future experiments. 
10During the period of the experiment1 regular UI benefits were 48% of base period wages, with a 
ceiling of $154 per week. 
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however, have a much smaller effect on participation than do weekly UI benefit levels. 
The average UI benefit in our sample is $119 with a standard deviation of about $40. 
A $40 increase in weekly UI benefits causes nearly a 3 percent decline in participation 
in the subsidy experiment. Contrast this effect to that observed in the search bonus 
experiment where the coefficient is positive (though not significant). Wage subsidies are
much more attractive to those with lower benefits. What little self-selection there is in 
the bonus. program does not screen out high earnings workers to any significant degree. 
5 Effects on Employment and Earnings
In each period a worker is classified as either employed or unemployed. The basic idea is to 
specify a hazard function giving the probability that an unemployed individual becomes 
employed conditional on his or her employment history and demographic characteristics. 
Let Sit denote the employment status of worker i in period t, where S;, = 1 if employed 
and Sit = 0 otherwise. The hazard at period t for a subject assigned to treatment Ti = j 
is the probability of finding employment in period t conditional upon being unemployed 
in periods 1 ,  . . . , t - 1. We adopt a logistic specification for the hazard function, 
, . exp((JjXit) Pit= P(S;, = lJSi1 = ·· · = Si,t-1 = 0,Xit,Ti =J) = 1 . ((J'X· ) ' +exp j ,t 
where Xit is a set of time-varying covariates. The probability that an individual unem­
ployed in period t fails to find a job in that period is 1 - Rt· 
Each worker in the experiment becomes unemployed and files for UI benefits during 
either the second or third quarter of 1984 and we follow their employment status for 26
weeks after their initial claim date. Let Y; denote the number of weeks the ith subject is
observed to be unemployed, up to a maximum of 26 weeks. Any spell of unemployment 
longer than 26 weeks is censored. It follows that the conditional probability of observing 
an unemployment spell of length Y; which is either complete (c; = 0) or censored (c; = 1)
IS: 
Yi-1 
L;(Y;, c;) = P;'.Y,c'(l - P;,y,)°' IT (1 - Pit) (3) t=l 
From (3) we form the log likelihood for the full .sample which can be ,optimized with 
a conventional multinomial logit program. We have estimated weekly, monthly, and 
quarterly models with roughly similar results, but will only report results using a weekly 
periodicity here. 
Estimates of the effects of treatment (assignment to either the wage subsidy or bonus
groups) and agreement to participate (i.e., did the worker accept the voucher) are shown
in Table 7. Controls for age, race, sex, prior wages, and UI benefit level are included in 
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each specification. Separate effects of experimental treatment, agreement to participate, 
and UI benefit level are estimated for the first and second quarters of each UI spell. 
Finally, we include either a linear time trend (number of weeks unemployed) or a set of 
period dummies to capture duration dependence not explained by other variables. The 
first three columns of Table 7 contain models estimated for each of the three experimental 
groups. Since the demographic variables have similar effects in each group, data from 
the three groups were pooled to obtain the estimates in the last two columns of Table 7.
To simplify the discussion, we interpret the coefficients in terms of percentage changes in 
hazard rates (holding the remaining variables at their mean values) and focus upon the 
pooled estimates in the fourth column of the table. 
I Table 7 about here I 
Once again, we find important differences between the wage subsidy and search bonus 
programs. The weekly escape rate in the control group is about 3.2%. There is no sig­
nificant effect of assignment to the search bonus group for those who refuse to accept 
the voucher. Participation in the bonus experiment increases the probability of reem­
ployment in any week during the first quarter of an unemployment spell by about 0.6%. 
In contrast, there is no significant effect of participation in the wage subsidy experi­
ment beyond assignment to the treatment group. Subjects who refuse the wage subsidy 
voucher experience a 0.4% increase in their weekly probability of reemployment in the 
first quarter of an unemployment spell. Since the program incentives disappear after 
approximately three months, it is not surprising that there are no significant effects of 
either treatment or agreement to participate during the second quarter of the spell. 
Controlling for a limited set of individual characteristics, we see that both partici­
pants and nonparticipants in the wage subsidy experiment become employed significantly 
faster than those in the control group. If it were possible to match controls and nonpar­
ticipants in the wage subsidy experiment on all relevant attributes, average duration of 
unemployment should be the same for comparable individuals. However, the estimates 
in Table 7 imply shorter unemployment spells for those who refused the subsidy than for 
controls-not because of any treatment effect (since they clearly derived no benefit from 
the subsidy), but because of self-selection. 
We do not have enough measures of individual characteristics to adequately control 
for the effects of self-selection so the estimates in Table 7 cannot be given a structural 
interpretation .. Instead, we use equation (2) to.estimate.the impact of either wage subsidy 
or bonus participation on workers of different types. For example, the expected duration 
of unemployment for a 40 year old black female with base period wages of $250 who 
accepts the wage subsidy voucher is 20.8 weeks, a reduction of 0. 72 weeks from her 
expected duration if she had not been offered the voucher. A similar calculation indicates 
that a reduction of 0.93 weeks is attributable to the bonus. For those who agree to 
participate, the wage subsidy and search bonus have similar size effects on employment, 
though, of course, the average effect of the wage subsidy is considerably smaller because 
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of lower participation rates. 
The other response variable of interest is the level of reemployment wages. One would 
expect the shorter durations of unemployment found in the experimental groups to have 
resulted from shifts in labor supply or demand and to be reflected in reemployment wage 
rates. We estimated a regression equation relating weekly wages in the post-claim quarter 
to experimental treatment, agreement to participate, and base period earnings. Ordinary 
least squares (OLS) estimates are displayed i�tJi�first column of Table 8.11 
I Table 8 about here I 
The average weekly wage equations suffer from potential selection bias since the 
sample is restricted to those workers who gain employment in the quarter following 
their initial UI claim. To correct for censoring, we use the selectivity correction devel­
oped in Dubin and McFadden (1984). In our case, the selection term takes the form 
-[Fi,Y. logFi,Y; + (1 - P,,y.)log(l - P,,y.)]/P,,Y,, where Pi,Y; is the estimated probabil­
ity of escape for the period in which the worker is rehired. The escape probabilities 
were estimated using the duration model reported in the fourth column of Table 7. The 
selectivity-corrected estimates are presented in the last column of Table 8. 
The results in Table 8 are a reprise of our earlier findings. Nonparticipants in the 
wage subsidy experiment earn $43 more per week than their counterparts in the control 
group, who earn about the same amount as participants in the subsidy experiment. 
There is no discernible effect of the bonus upon nonparticipants. The wages of search 
bonus participants are estimated to be $31 higher than controls, though this difference 
is imprecisely estimated. (A 95% confidence interval ranges from -$6 to $56. )12
It is not clear on a priori grounds whether the benefits of a wage subsidy accrue to 
workers or their employers. If workers maintain a constant reservation wage, the subsidy 
should induce employers to increase employment without any change in wage levels. On 
the other hand, the subsidy may cause workers to adjust their wage demands upward. 
In the first case, employers are better off because the subsidy reduces the effective cost 
of labor, while in the latter workers capture the subsidy. The most probable outcome is 
an increase in both employment and wage rates. 
A search bonus has the same real effects as a wage subsidy if nominal wage rates are 
adjusted to incorpoi;ate the present.value .of the.bcmus. In nominal terms, however, we 
would expect higher employment levels to be accompanied by lower wages. A simulation 
11The estimated coefficient on lagged wages is similar to that found by Addison and Portugal (1989). 
They include duration of unemploy1nent in the reemployment wage equation instead of a selectivity 
correction. 
12The estimated coefficient of the selectivity correction term implies a correlation of 0.41 between the 
unobservables in the average vveekly wage equation and the latent logistic error in the duration inodel 
for the period of escape (Dubin and McFadden, 1984: p. 352). 
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of wage effects using equation (2) confirms that the wage subsidy raises participant wages 
slightly (by $23), but, contrary to expectations, the bonus also raises wages (and by a
larger amount, $30). One possible explanation is that bonuses causes workers to increase 
the intensity of job search without any change in their reservation wage level. 
6 Biscussion and�eonclusions
Experiments are very helpful in evaluating policy alternatives, but their analysis is some­
times more problematic than it first appears. The design of most social experiments 
differs substantially from what is typical in biomedical applications. Random allocation 
of treatments does not determine what the subjects do with the treatments. The stan­
dard experimental comparisons actually measure the effect of being offered the treatment 
rather than using it. Since the effect of the treatment is known to be zero for refusals, it 
may be difficult to detect substantial effects for participants when the participation rate 
is low. In principle these problems could be reduced by securing agreement to participate 
before assignment of treatments, but there is no way to control post-assignment attrition 
without a placebo. 
Analyses that ignore participation rates tend to confuse low participation with small 
treatment effects on participants. We have demonstrated that wage subsidies and search 
bonuses have similar size effects upon participants, but have substantially different pat­
terns of participation. Lower participation rates imply that the potential total bene­
fits from the subsidy program are smaller than those from the search bonus program, 
but benefits constitute only one side of the cost-benefit ledger. Though Woodbury and 
Spiegelman ( 1987) found that the benefit-cost ratio was higher for wage subsidies than 
search bonuses, their results have been interpreted as showing that wage subsidies are 
ineffectual (Kerachsky and Corson, 1988: p. 115). 
Wage subsidies and search bonuses have rather different effects on different segments 
of the labor market. Bonuses appear to work primarily by increasing the intensity of 
search, rather than by modifying reservation wage levels or employer demand for labor. 
Bonus vouchers are accepted by nearly all workers and are paid largely to those who would 
find employment in the normal course of events, albeit after collecting less unemployment 
compensation than they currently do. Wage subsidies, on the other hand, will typically 
be refused by high wage workers who appear reluctant, for whatever reason, to identify 
themselves as beneficiaries of a government assistance program. For low wage workers, 
particularly those near the minimum wage level, a wage subsidy has distinct advantages 
over a search bonus. More generally, wage subsidies tend to be cost effective because they 
are paid only to those unemployed workers who use them as incentives for employers to 
hire them. If tbe subsidy does not assist the worker in finding a job, the worker won't 
utilize the subsidy and it won't be paid. 
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Control 
Wage Subsidy 
Search Bonus 
n 
F 
p 
Table 1: Summary of Illinois UI Experiments 
Initial Claimants 
Agreed to Participate 
Rehired -within 11 Weeks 
Notice of Hire Submitted 
Voucher Paid 
Wage Search 
Control Subsidy Bonus 
3931 3781 3930 
35.03 
68.03 88.83 
37.93 40.43 
5.03 18.43 
2.83 13.53 
UI Benefits Paid (First Spell) $2278 $2166 $2085 
UI Benefits Paid (Benefit Year) $2492 $2422 
Table 2: Average Gross Weekly Earnings 
$2331 
Base Period Post-Claim Quarter 
Agreed to Refused to All Agreed to Refused to All 
Participate Participate Claimants Participate Participate Claimants 
254 94 
240 285 254 89 113 97 
256 252 256 106 94 105 
5953 1611 11410 5953 1611 11410 
12.0 8.5 0.1 13.0 3.6 4.1 
<0.01 <0.01 0.91 <0.01 0.06 0.02 
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Table 3 :  Average Weekly Wage Rates* 
Base Period Post-Claim Quarter 
· Agreed to · ·Refused to All Agreed to Refused to 
Participate Participate Claimants Participate Participate 
Control 264 
Wage Subsidy 247 289 261 225 301 
Search Bonus 265 259 264 256 242 
n 2894 743 5308 2894 743 
F 6.6 3.2 0.3 5.1 1.9 
p <0.01 0.07 0.77 0.02 0.17 
*Includes only workers rehired before end of post-claim quarter.
Participation 
Participation 
Table 4: Experimental Design 
Polio Experiment 
Assignment 
Agreed 
Refused 
Control Treatment 
Control I Treatment
Refusals 
Unemployment Experiment 
Assignment 
Agreed 
Refused 
Control Treatment 
Treatment 
Control 
Refusals 
20 
All 
Claimants 
253 
250 
254 
5308 
0.1 
0.93 
Table 5: Adjusted Estimates of Treatment Differences* 
Wage Subsidy Search Bonus 
Response Variable U nadjusted Adjusted Unadjusted Adjusted 
Weeks of Insured -0.69 -1 .01 -1 .34 - 1 .51 
Unemployment (-2.35) (-2.35) (-5.36) (-5.35) 
UI Benefits Paid -113 -166 -193 -218 
(First spell) (-4.07) (-4.07) (-5.69) (-5.68) 
UI Benefits Paid -70 -102 -161 -182 
(Benefit year) (-2.09) (-2.09) (-4.85) (-4.84) 
*t-statistics in parentheses.
Table 6: Logit Estimates of Participation Rates* 
Wage Search 
Subsidy Bonus 
Constant 1 .802 2.227 
(3.661) (3.156) 
Male 0.289 0.299 
(3.872) (2.823) 
Black 0.002 -0.294 
(0.024) (-2.479) 
Hispanic -0.944 -0.655 
(-7.257) (-3.763) 
Log Age -0.138 -0.018 
(-0.963) (-0.088) 
Base Weekly Wage -0.107 -0.003 
(in $100's) (-3.643) (-0.066) 
· Weekly ·Benefit Amount -o.·299 -0.093 
(in $100's) (-2.257) (-0.491) 
Log Likelihood -2257 -1342 
n 3701 3865 
*t-statistics in parentheses.
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Table 7: Logistic Hazard Models for Unemployment Spells* 
Wage Search 
Control Subsidy Bonus Pooled Pooled 
Constant -1.72 -1.24 -1.79 -1.59 
(-5 . 30) (-3.87) (-5.61) (-8.68) Period 
Weeks Unemployed -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 dummies 
(-2.86) (-4.99) (-3.36) (-6.62) 
Log Age -0.40 -0.46 -0.41 -0.42 -0.43 
(-4.27) (-5.03) (-4.51) (-7.96) (-7.99) 
Black -0.63 -0.58 -0.60 -0.60 -0.61 
(-10.64) (-9.82) (-10.39) (-17.80) (-17.80) 
Hispanic -0.26 -0.30 -0.28 -0.27 -0.27 
(-2.92) (-2.95) (-3.13) (-5.17) (-5.17) 
Male 0.06 -0.07 0.06 0.02 0.02 
(1 .35) (-1.56) (1.22) (0.57) ( 0.56) 
Base Weekly Wages 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.05 
(in $100s) (3.72) (3.14) (2.43) (5.30) (5.34) 
Weekly Benefit (in $100s) 
First Quarter -0.20 -0.23 -0.10 -0.17 -0.03 
(-2.40) (-2.79) (-1.23) (-3.60) (-5.22) 
Second Quarter -0.29 -0.16 0.02 -0.15 0.06 
(-3.18) (-1.64) (0.20) (-2.72) (0.90) 
Wage Subsidy Treatment 
F irst Quarter 0.11 0.07 
(1.89) (1.25) 
Second Quarter -0.02 0.05 
(-0.19) ( 0.63) 
Search Bonus Treatment 
F irst Quarter 0.05 0.00 
(0.53) (0.05) 
Second Quarter -0.12 -0.04 
(-0.93) (-0.30) 
Wage Subsidy Agreement 
F irst Quarter 0.07 0.05 0.04 
(1.27) (0.78) (0.66) 
Second Quarter -0.09 -0.03 -0.02 
(-1.20) (-0.40) (-0.18) 
Search Bonus Agreement 
First Quarter 0.29 0.19 0.19 
(3.47) (2.17) (2.18) 
Second Quarter -0.10 0.11 0.11 
(-0.91) (0.86) (0.88) 
Log Likelihood -8970 -8818 -9448 -27177 -26655 
n 3845 3701 3865 11411 11411 
*t-statistics in parentheses.
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Table 8: Estimates of A vera.ge Weekly Wage* 
Uncorrected Corrected 
Constant 81 .712 -41.82 
(7.438) (-5.029) 
Wage Subsidy Treatment 32.619 43.389 
( 1 .916) (2.544) 
Search Bonus Treatment -7.189 -3.006 
(-0.266) (-0 .111)  
Wage Subsidy Agreement -48.688 -40.903 
(-2.722) (-2.288) 
Search Bonus Agreement 10.001 33.944 
(0.370) ( 1 .247) 
Base Weekly Wage 0.646 0.671 
(24.670) (25.383) 
Selection Correction 1 1 1 .7 
(6.06) 
R2 0.106 0 .112 
n 5309 5309 
Standard Error of Regression 348.3 347.2 
*t-statistics in parentheses.
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F igure 1 :  Percentage of Unempfoyed Workers Rehired 
0 . 08 
0 . 0 6 
0 . 0 4 
0 . 02 
0 . 0 0 
Weeks following Initial UI Claim 
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